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This paper oﬀers a noncooperative behaviourally-founded solution of the
complete information bargaining problem where two impatient individuals
wish to divide a unit pie. We formulate the game in continuous time, with
unrestricted timing and content of oﬀers. Reprising experimental work from
1960, we introduce and explore aspirational equilibrium — a Markovian reﬁne-
ment of subgame perfection where behaviour is governed by aspiration values
(expected payoﬀs). The analysis is tractable, and generates many intuitive
aspects of bargaining absent from the standard temporal monopoly paradigm.
We ﬁnd that discounted aspiration values form a martingale, and thereby
compute bounds on the expected bargaining duration. We also deduce some
simple implications about consecutive oﬀers, and relate delay times, oﬀers,
and acceptance rates. Finally, we draw into question a traditional comparative
static: Ceteris paribus, more impatient players can expect more of the pie.
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“The whole creation groans and yearns, desiderating a principle of arbitration ::: ”
— Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics (1881), part II, page 46
The classic bargaining problem presents two individuals with the opportunity to share
a dollar if they can ﬁrst agree on a partition. The rebirth of interest in this subject from
a modern noncooperative approach dates to Rubinstein (1982), itself related to St˚ ahl
(1972). He proposes a discrete time alternating oﬀer model with payoﬀ discounting.
We shall focus on three critical “realistic” elements of the above bargaining problem:
(i) two risk neutral players 1;2 must divide a unit pie, by concurring on a feasible split;
(ii) an agreement means a proposal by one player and an immediate acceptance by the
other; (iii) the force for timely resolution is the players’ impatience. Like Rubinstein
(1982), we shall ignore the additional (and important) element of incomplete information.
Harsanyi (1956) observed: “As is well-known, ordinary economic theory is unable
to predict the terms on which agreements tend to be reached in cases of ::: bilateral
monopoly. Only on the basis of additional assumptions does the theory of games furnish
a determinate solution.” Rubinstein’s assumptions about the action space converted the
intractable bilateral monopoly into a simple sequence of temporal monopolies: In his
alternating oﬀer bargaining model, players in turn are given the power to ask the other
party to accept an oﬀer, or to burn some of the pie by declining. This yielded a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) with an immediate agreement favouring the proposer.
Temporal monopoly captures situations where the time cost of each negotiation round
plays a central role in the players’ minds. While there are many situations with this critical
feature, this eﬀect intuitively should play no role in procedure-less settings. Players may
well care about delay, and yet consider the reply time unimportant for this delay.
This paper explores the bargaining problem without temporal monopoly, and instead
aims for a behaviourally motivated noncooperative solution. Since discrete time forces
temporal monopoly, we shift to continuous time, where there are inﬁnitely many SPE.
View a discrete time model, or more generally temporal monopoly, as a restriction of the
feasible action space to a subset of continuous time. We instead build the behavioural
foundation into the solution concept — aspirational equilibrium (AE). In this Markovian
reﬁnement of SPE, players’ behaviour is governed by their aspiration values, or expected
payoﬀs in the game. While quite tractable as we will see, the resulting theory is richer than
temporal monopoly, and oﬀers many compelling new economic insights into bargaining.
Continuous Time Bargaining and Aspirational Equilibrium. As argued, to avoid
the temporal monopoly outcome, we must allow players to react instantaneously, and
thereby must start with a model nested from the outset in continuous time. Continuous
time models introduce a host of well-known problems, most especially the twin issues that
(i) outcome proﬁles need not be well-deﬁned given strategies, and (ii) best replies need not
exist. We construct an extensive form game that eludes both problems. This extensive
form game uses the novel idea of a two-dimensional vector time and a restriction on
histories that precludes the players from conditioning their actions on time. We succinctly
1summarize this feature of our extensive form as sealed-envelope instructions — at oﬀer
decision nodes, the players simultaneously commit to mixed (oﬀer, time) pairs.
With this new structure, outcome proﬁles are well-deﬁned, and we introduce four
assumptions that reﬁne SPE. The ﬁrst three essentially ensure time stationary strategies,
disallowing time-dependent oﬀers, or bargaining as cheap talk or protocol. The fourth
assumption asks that strategies coincide after any histories with the same expected payoﬀs.
The Intuitive Structure of Aspirational Equilibria. For a ﬂavour of this reﬁnement,
consider an AE without immediate agreement. As strategies depend on expected payoﬀs
alone and not on time, delay owes solely to the players’ randomization. With strict time
preference, there are rents from ending this bargaining hiatus. And since any player is
indiﬀerent about proposing, only the opponent strictly beneﬁts from this oﬀer. In other
words, any delay implies that the players are locked in a war of attrition: Each strictly
prefers that his counterpart and not himself stop the clock and propose. To summarize, an
endogenous ‘proposee’ advantage arises, since receiving an oﬀer makes one better oﬀ. This
is precisely opposite to the hard-wired proposer advantage with temporal monopoly, and
is the ultimate source of the diﬀerent implications between these bargaining paradigms.
Next consider what transpires when some player, say Mr. 1, ﬁnally tenders an oﬀer
to Mr. 2. The latter might accept it with probability one. If so, game over. Assume not.
Agreement brings us to the Pareto frontier, and is eﬃcient, while rejection incurs further
delay, and is ineﬃcient. Since Mr. 2 weakly prefers to reject, Mr. 1 must be disappointed
by this outcome, suﬀering a strict payoﬀ loss if Mr. 2 declines, and payoﬀ jump otherwise.
This yields several desirable and realistic bargaining features: (i) wars of attrition explain
negotiation lags; (ii) serious oﬀers are concessions; (iii) oﬀers may be turned down; (iv)
proposers are strictly disappointed from rejection, and strictly pleased by acceptance.
An AE speciﬁes exogenously-given aspiration levels for the players — the initial state
of a Markov process. Once Mr. 1 oﬀers x, Mr. 2’s aspiration value jumps to this new
level x. Afterwards, the concession that is oﬀered may yet be rejected. (See Figure 1.)
This leads to a tractable Markov and martingale stochastic process on the space of possible
pairs of discounted aspiration levels (Theorem 4). We can then conclude that bargaining
almost surely ends in ﬁnite time; we also use this process to provide a simple lower bound
on the duration of bargaining based upon observed alternating oﬀers (Corollaries 3–4).
Contrast with Temporal Monopoly. Temporal monopoly in no way precludes en-
dogenous timing — as Perry and Reny (1993), Sakovics (1993), and Stahl (1993) have
clearly demonstrated. They posit continuous time bargaining games where players have
tiny ‘waiting’ and ‘reaction’ times after oﬀers. This temporal monopoly setting yields
very small monopoly rents, and an accordingly small proposer advantage. Consequently,
the normative predictions of our model do not obtain — wars of attrition and strict con-
cessions. Since their results intuitively obtain for random but boundedly positive mean
waiting times after oﬀers, at ﬁrst blush one might presume that our AE are merely special
cases. But our timing is truly unrestricted — and to the player with an aspiration level
approaching its highest level, oﬀers must be tendered arbitrarily quickly (Theorem 3).
We explore some key links between when and what to oﬀer, and what to accept. The
second of consecutive oﬀers by a player is more generous (Corollary 5). Also, incentive
2constraints force a trade-oﬀ between the oﬀer content and delay time (Corollary 6), as well
as the chance an oﬀer is rejected and the surplus it concedes (Corollary 7). We show how
some properties — sweetening an oﬀer raises its acceptance chance (Corollary 8), for one
— turn on a decreasing or convex aspiration set, which we also characterize (Lemma 8–9).
The distinction between a proposer and proposee advantage yields an enlightening
contrast between the models. In our ﬁnal result, we explore what happens if player 1
becomes more impatient. In the temporal monopoly framework, this increases player 2’s
temporal advantage, and forces both players to propose pie splits more favourable to
player 2. In our aspirational framework, notwithstanding the multitude of equilibria, we
believe that there is insight gained from posing this question. At the very least, it questions
the validity of the conclusion in the temporal monopoly world. In a word, we ask what
happens to the whole equilibrium set. We argue that there is a natural bijection between
AE in the two worlds where player 1 is more and less impatient. Provided player 2 oﬀers
more rapidly, all incentive conditions are restored at the current aspiration levels. With
this mapping, we can see that the ﬁnal outcome splits in the AE with a more impatient
player 1 place player 2 more often in the strategically disadvantageous oﬀering role. We
show in Theorem 5 that this raises the expected ultimate pie share of player 1.
Experimental Support for Aspirational Approach. The salience of aspirations in
decision-making has long been established in the psychology literature (Siegel 1957). In
fact, its signiﬁcance in bargaining has long ago been investigated in laboratory tests.
Siegel and Fouraker (1960) studied a simple buyer-seller bargaining game. The project’s
goal was to investigate the role of diﬀerential information on the bargaining split, seeing
whether the better-informed party excelled. But among the “interesting implications”,
they conclude that “the basis of both the bargainer’s ‘expectancy’ and, at least partially,
of his ‘bargaining strength’ may very well be his level of aspiration” (p. 60). While the
authors expected the 50-50 equal split under complete information, their experiments
showed how aspirations acted as a dynamic anchor on the bids made, and explored how
the exchange of oﬀers aﬀected these aspirations. A key role played by oﬀers in an AE
— to ratchet up the opponent’s aspiration level — was observed in a speciﬁc experiment
(pp. 80–81), as was the intertemporal non-monotonicity of a player’s oﬀer (pp. 77–90).
Relative to the literature, we take some liberty in our use of the term “aspiration.”
We take Siegel and Fouraker’s phrase ‘expectancy’ literally, as our aspiration is a rational
expectation and not a purely arbitrary benchmark or “reference point” against which gains
and losses are compared (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994)). For we wish to provide a non ad
hoc basis for the aspirations discussed by the psychological studies. This gives the desired
dynamic anchor for behavior sought by Siegel and Fouraker. A few papers (recently,
Karandikar, Mookherjee, and Ray (1998)) have studied models where aspirations evolve
over time. With our rational aspirations, the evolution is endogenous to the model.
Outline. Section 2 develops an extensive form with which we may formally speak of
subgame perfect equilibria. This is essential, for in section 3, we develop our aspirational
reﬁnement of subgame perfection. Some immediate properties are explored in section 4,
and sensitivity analysis is performed in section 5. The conclusion in section 6 links some
of the details of our approach to the literature. We appendicize two technical proofs.
32 The Continuous Time Bargaining Model
A. Overview. Two players i 2 f1;2g (often denoted i;j) must split a unit pie. The
players are impatient, discounting future payoﬀs by possibly diﬀerent positive interest
rates r1;r2 > 0. The players’ outside options are each zero. All parameters are common
knowledge. Bargaining transpires in real time on [0;1). At a time of his choosing, either
party may propose a pie split. Proposals must lie on the Pareto frontier where pie shares
sum to one — and so may be summarized by the share x 2 [0;1] oﬀered to the other
party. To capture the irreversibility of tendering an oﬀer and the risk of rejecting, oﬀers
are assumed ﬁnal and ‘exploding’: They must be immediately either accepted — thereby
ending the game — or rejected, with no explicit future commitment. (On the other hand,
we shall see that in equilibrium, rejected oﬀers will have implied future repurcussions.)
We now formally introduce the model and the notion of subgame perfection. In so
doing, there are two main problems we must tackle. First, is the possibility of simultaneous
oﬀers and immediate counteroﬀers. For this, we introduce a notion of vector time, thereby
nuancing between the simultaneous and the instantaneous. Second, and more delicate, the
existence of a well-deﬁned outcome path h¾ from a given strategy proﬁle ¾ is problematic.
For since the continuum is not well-ordered (there is no ﬁrst time before or after a given
moment), there need not be an initial historical cause for any current action proﬁle.1
To handle this problem, we develop a richer notion of an action space, and maintain a
standard extensive form.2 In our approach every outcome path of the extensive form is
countably discrete. This concept will better reﬂect the fact that a strategy must be a plan
of action. That is, it must dictate what happens now given the past history.
B. Real Time Bargaining. Let S = [0;1] [ fY;Ng be the set of the available actions
when players ‘speak’, where x 2 [0;1] is the share of the unit pie oﬀered to the other player,
and the response is Y = ‘yes’ or N = ‘no’. The vector time domain is T = [0;1) £ N.
For any (t;k) 2 T , t refers to the real time, and k refers to the artiﬁcial time at any
real moment t. That is, the second component k counts the number of events that occur
at a moment in time, and increments whenever players reply instantaneously, thereby
‘stopping the clock’.3 Let Â denote the natural strict lexicographic order on T , namely,
(t;k) Â (t0;k0) if t > t0 or t = t0 and k > k0. Let º be the corresponding weak order.
A path is a countable subset h ½ f1;2g£S£T satisfying the following. Each element
(i;s;(t;k)) 2 h is an event, where i is the player acting, s the action taken, and (t;k)
the time. If (i;s;(t;k));(i0;s0;(t0;k0)) 2 h then (t;k) 6= (t0;k0). If (i;s;(t;k)) 2 h and
k > 1, then there are k ¡ 1 preceding events at time t in h, namely (i`;s`;(t;`)) 2 h,
1For instance, Bergin and MacLeod (1993) give an example of a continuum of outcome paths that are
all consistent with a strategy proﬁle, but not actually determined (or caused) by that proﬁle.
2An alternative format employed by Bergin and MacLeod (1993) allows players to condition on the
event history as well as the real time, thus formally producing a continuum of decision nodes. To tame
the strategies, they introduce ‘inertia’ into the strategies. By contrast, Simon and Stinchcombe (1989)
deliberately take the view of continuous time as very ﬁne discrete time.
3We have been unable to ﬁnd this approach elsewhere in the literature. An unrelated notion that also
tries to deal with the inadequacies of the real time domain owes to Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). They
introduce variable intensity atoms to handle entry in pre-emption games.
4` = 1;::: ;k¡1; further, s` 2 [0;1] for each odd `, s` = N for each even `, and i2j¡1 6= i2j.
If h contains an inﬁnite sequence of events at real time t, then the ﬁrst event after t (if
one exists) must be an oﬀer. Let P denote the set of paths.
C. Histories. For paths h 2 P, deﬁne T1(h) = supft j (i;s;(t;k)) 2 hg and T2(h) =
supfk j (i;s;(t;k)) 2 h and t = T1(h)g. A history is a path that ends in some ﬁnite real
time, and thereby belongs to H = fh 2 P j T1(h) < 1g. A history h 2 H has a last event
if there exists an element (i;s;(t;k)) 2 h where (t;k) = (T1(h);T2(h)). We distinguish
histories with ‘last events’ from those without one.
We partition H into ﬁve sets. First, histories in Hi have a standing oﬀer by player i:
Hi = fh 2 H j (i;s;(T1(h);T2(h))) 2 h and T2(h) < 1 is oddg:
By deﬁnition, when T2(h) < 1 is odd, the last event (i;s;(T1(h);T2(h))) corresponds to
an oﬀer; i.e., s 2 [0;1]. Similarly, when T2(h) < 1 is even, the last event corresponds to
a response s 2 fY;Ng. The set of all histories where the last oﬀer has just been accepted
is HY. Similarly, HN consists of the null history and all histories ending in a rejected
oﬀer. Finally, HnfH1 [H2 [HY [HNg are all other histories with no last event. There
are two types of such histories. First, histories h 2 H+ have a cluster point, ending in
a sequence of events f(in;sn;(tn;kn));n 2 Ng, where tn " T1(h) < 1. Second, histories
h 2 H++ ‘end’ in a deadlock at real time T1(h) if they have the property T2(h) = 1:
there is a sequence of events f(in;sn;(T1(h);n));n2Ng, with sn = N for all n even.
A ﬁnite history uniquely identiﬁes a decision node in the game tree. Here we also in-
troduce an oﬀer node “after” inﬁnite histories associated with cluster points or deadlocks.
D. Actions and Sealed Envelope Instructions. As usual, a strategy proﬁle ¾ =
(¾1;¾2) will map from H into an action set. We imagine that at each decision node, a
player is called upon either to approve a tabled oﬀer, or to submit his instructions (in an
envelope to his bargaining agent) about when and what he will oﬀer next. The action
set Ai(h) of player i at h described below reﬂects the facts that: (a) he cannot speak if
he has just tendered an oﬀer, or if the game has ended; (b) he must reply if an oﬀer has
just been tendered to him; (c) once an oﬀer has been rejected, he must plan to propose
an oﬀer x 2 [0;1] after some elapse time in [0;1], possibly immediately or never (zero or
inﬁnite elapse time); but (d) it is not feasible to propose an oﬀer at the current moment
(zero elapse time) after a deadlock, where there has been no last event. Altogether,
Ai(h) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
; if h 2 Hi [ HY
fY;Ng if h 2 Hj
[0,1]£[0;1] if h 2 HN [ H+
[0,1]£(0;1] if h 2 H++:
We call histories h 2 Hj reply nodes, and histories h 2 HN [ H+ [ H++ oﬀer nodes.
A strategy is a map ¾ on H such that ¾i(h) 2 Ai(h) for all h 2 H.
Hereafter, B(X) are the Borel measurable subsets of X (where the topology will be
understood from the context), and ∆(X) the set of probability measures on (X;B(X)).
A behaviour strategy ¾ is a proﬁle of mixtures ¾i(h) 2 ∆(Ai(h)) for all histories h 2 H.
5E. Histories Generated from Strategies. We now deﬁne the outcome path h¾ 2 P
generated by a strategy proﬁle ¾. A naive method to construct h(¾) is to start with the
null history, and then (possibly forever) sequentially append the ‘next event’ associated
with ¾(h) to the current history h. However, this may not be possible because it will
never advance the real time past any deadlock or cluster point.
For any (t;k);(¿;`) 2 T , deﬁne (t;k) © (¿;`) = (t + ¿;`) if ¿ > 0 and otherwise
(t;k) © (0;`) = (t;k + `). For short, we write (t;k) © ¿ instead of (t;k) © (¿;1). For any
path h 2 P, we deﬁne a successor path Ã¾(h) determined from h by the strategy proﬁle ¾.
There are three cases:
² If h 2 Hj then Ã¾(h) = h [ f(i;¾i(h);(T1(h);T2(h) + 1))g
² If h 2 HY or T1(h) = 1 then Ã¾(h) = h
² Assume h 2 HN [ H+ and (xi;ti) = ¾i(h). If t1 = t2 = 1, then Ã¾(h) = h.
Otherwise, Ã¾(h) = h[f(i;xi;T(h)©ti)g, where i = 1 if t2 ¸ t1 and i = 2 if t2 < t1.
In the ﬁrst case, there’s a standing oﬀer by j 2 f1;2g, and i must respond at once. In
the second case, the game has ended or bargaining lasts forever, since for any real time,
there is always a next oﬀer. The third case may be hardest to digest. It considers two
possibilities with no oﬀer on the table. First, both players may decide never to speak
again. Alternatively, one or more players may plan to propose in ﬁnite time; if the oﬀer
is immediate, then only the artiﬁcial time advances. As an arbitrary tie-breaking rule, if
both players speak simultaneously, we assume that only player 1 is heard.
For any h 2 P and (t;k) 2 [0;1)£f1;::: ;1g, let h(t;k) = f(i;s;(¿;`)) 2 h j (¿;`) ¹
(t;k) g. Observe that h(t;k) = ; if h contains no events weakly before (t;k). Fix a pure
strategy ¾. An arbitrary path h 2 P may be inconsistent with ¾ as it may contain events
that are not generated by ¾. For example, it may be that ¾(;) = ((x1;10);(x2;20)), so
that the oﬀer by player 1 will arrive ﬁrst. Then, any history h containing events before
time 10 is incompatible with ¾. Accordingly, let us deﬁne
H(¾) = f h 2 P j Ã¾(h(t;k)) ½ h 8(t;k) Á T(h) g:
The appendix proves that our extensive form results in a well-deﬁned outcome proﬁle:
Lemma 1 (Outcome Proﬁles) The outcome path h¾ is well-deﬁned by h¾ = inffh 2
H(¾)jh = Ã¾(h)g, where the inﬁmum is taken w.r.t. set inclusion (h¾=; if H(¾) = ;).
F. Payoﬀs and Subgame Perfection. The payoﬀ to a pure strategy proﬁle ¾ with
h¾ 2 HY is the vector ¼(¾) = (¼1(¾);¼2(¾)), where ¼i(¾) = e¡rit(1¡x) and ¼j(¾) = e¡rjtx
if player i made the ﬁnal oﬀer x at time t = T1(h¾) < 1 and player j accepted it.
Otherwise, if bargaining lasts forever, or no proposal occurs after some rejection, then
¼(¾) = 0. The payoﬀ ¼(¾) of a behavior strategy ¾ is deﬁned by taking expectations.
A behavior strategy proﬁle ¾ is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if for all h 2
H n (Hi [ HY), any (s;t) 2 supp(¾i(h)) is a best reply to ¾j at h. This paper is in fact
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Figure 1: Example Aspiration Set, Payoﬀ Frontier, and Transitions. Aspiration
value pairs are denoted by ±, and agreements by ². Lines indicate continuations following
proposals. Proposals are sometimes turned down by his opponent who is indiﬀerent.
entirely focused on a Markovian class of subgame perfect equilibria. To step back from
the abstraction and ﬁx ideas, we now give a simple example that we later revisit.
Example (Constant Acceptance Rate): In the example SPE, whenever one
player’s aspiration value (his expected payoﬀ) is vi, the other’s will be '(vi), where ' :
(0;1) ! (0;1) is the strictly decreasing function '(vi) = (1 ¡ vi)=(1 + vi). Note that
' = '¡1 and so the graph G(') is symmetric, and that v + '(v) < 1 for all v 2 (0;1).
Our mixed strategy equilibrium is Markovian with state space G('), and an arbitrary
initial state in G('). At any v 2 G('), each player i chooses a proposal ¯ xi(v) and
randomly chooses an elapse time from an exponential distribution with parameter ¸i(v).
If player 1’s oﬀer x1 prevails, say, where possibly x1 6= ¯ x1(v) (if player 1 deviates), then
player 2 accepts it with ﬁxed probability ® 2 (0;1) if x1 ¸ ¯ x1(v), and rejects it otherwise.
If the oﬀer is rejected, the state moves to ('(x1);x1) if x1 ¸ v2, and remains at v otherwise.
The functions ¸j and ¯ xj (j = 1;2) satisfy vi = (1 ¡ ®)'(¯ xi(v)) + ®(1 ¡ ¯ xi(v)). Hence,









so that player i is indiﬀerent about proposing at any moment or waiting for his opponent to
propose instead. It is easy to check that vi < (1¡®)'(¯ xi(v))+®(1¡¯ xi(v)) when xi > ¯ xi(v);
thus, player i does not want to make a disequilibrium oﬀer. Notice that since ¯ xi(v) > vj,
the equilibrium oﬀer is acceptable. Also, ¸i(v) < 1 everywhere; thus, deadlocks almost
surely do not occur. This also will be a general property of our aspirational equilibria.
Between oﬀer events, the players engage in a waiting game to see who will make the
next oﬀer. Eventually, one player breaks down and proposes a pie split; that oﬀer may
be rejected. The bargaining state randomly transitions through G(') as oﬀers are made
and rejected until absorption on the Pareto frontier, when an oﬀer is ﬁnally accepted.
73 The Aspirational Reﬁnement
Any pie split at any time is an SPE of our continuous-time model. We now introduce an
equilibrium reﬁnement motivated by the earlier psychological study of Siegel and Fouraker
(1960). We assume that players’ bargaining aspirations govern their behaviour. We
proceed via assumptions that ensure time-constant strategies and stationarity in payoﬀs.
3.1 Exponential Oﬀer Times
The proper subgame after an oﬀer node h is formally equivalent to the original game,
after resetting the clock. To ﬂesh this out, we need some notation. Introduce a forward
time-shift operator Υ(t;k) on histories. For all h0 2 H and vector times (¿;`), let
Υ(¿;`)(h
0) ´ f(i;s;(¿;`) © (t;k))j(i;s;(t;k)) 2 h
0g:
Let h be an oﬀer node and put (¿;`) = T(h). We now deﬁne the history: h followed by
h0 6= ;. If ` = 1, the ﬁrst event in h0 must occur after a positive elapse time. Then
h[Υ(¿;`)(h0) concatenates the prior history h with the new history h0. Thus for any oﬀer
node h, and any h0 2 H, deﬁne ¾ijh(h0) = ¾i(h [ Υ(¿;`)(h0)). Then ¼i(¾jh) is player i’s
expected continuation value after h, discounted from time T1(h).
Given an oﬀer node h and t > 0, let ¼(¾jh;t) denote the expected payoﬀ vector of
following ¾ after history h (discounted from time T1(h) + t), given that no intervening
event has occurred after h in [T1(h);T1(h) + t). Notice that ¼(¾jh;0) = ¼(¾jh).
The ﬁrst three properties of an SPE that we assume here are:
A1. Action-time independence: For all oﬀer nodes h, we have ¾i(h) = ¾x
i (h) £ ¾t
i(h),
where ¾x
i (h) 2 ∆([0;1]) and ¾t
i(h) 2 ∆([0;1]) are independent mixtures over oﬀers
and elapse times. Also, for all oﬀer nodes h, x 2 [0;1] and t ¸ 0, the probability
¾i(h[f(j;x;T(h)©t)g) that i accepts j’s oﬀer x does not depend on the real time t.
A2. Payoﬀ-time independence: For all oﬀer nodes h, the expected value ¼i(¾jh;t) is
independent of t 2 co(supp(¾t
j(h))).
A3. Meaningful oﬀers: Equilibrium oﬀers are accepted with strictly positive probability.
Action-time independence A1 asserts an independent randomization over oﬀers and
time. For while we have chosen a countably discrete extensive form to represent the game,
we still wish to admit the possibility that players may reassess their strategies at any point
in real time. Consider a discrete time bargaining game where in every period a player
randomizes over silence and proposing, assuming the other player doesn’t propose ﬁrst.
That this randomization is independent across periods is the analogue of our time station-
arity assumption. The standard diﬃculties with assuming a continuum of independent
randomizations in real time was another reason for our choice of extensive form.
While A1 precludes a drift in expected payoﬀs between oﬀer events, it does not restrict
the continuation values at oﬀer events. Payoﬀ-time independence A2 asserts that expected
values can only be aﬀected by proposal events. This precludes time as a coordination
8device, and thereby constrains continuation values. We thus focus on simple stationary
strategies: Player i’s expected value remains constant as long as it is possible that j makes
an oﬀer (the support restriction). To understand the convex hull proviso of A2, we have
in mind, following A1, strategies where player j randomizes between making an oﬀer or
not at every moment.
Assuming meaningful oﬀers A3 precludes oﬀers as either cheap talk, payoﬀ-irrelevant
babbling, or equilibrium protocol. It cannot be common knowledge, for instance, that the
ﬁrst oﬀer must be made and ignored. With our assumption in force, every oﬀer is serious,
and we are later able to make falsiﬁable predictions based on the oﬀers made.
Lemma 2 Let ¾ be an SPE satisfying A1–A3. Then for all oﬀer nodes h, the mixture
over oﬀer times has an exponential distribution, say F¸i(¿) = 1¡e¡¸i¿, where ¸i 2 [0;1].
Proof: For any oﬀer node h, let ¼1(¾jh[f(2;x;T(h)©t)) be player 1’s expected value once
player 2 makes the oﬀer (x;1 ¡ x) at t units of elapsed time after history h. If this is an
equilibrium oﬀer, then by A3, there is a positive probability that player 1 will accept it.








is player 1’s expected value immediately after receiving an (equilibrium) oﬀer from player 2
at time T1(h)+t, but before having seen its content. Clearly, ¯ ¼1(t) does not depend on t,
and thus it will be denoted simply by ¯ ¼1. By assumption A3, ¯ ¼1 > 0.
Let G2(¿) = ¾t
2(h)([0;¿]) be the chance that player 2 makes an oﬀer in the time interval
[T1(h);T1(h) + ¿]. We ﬁrst claim that either G2(t) = 1 for all t ¸ 0, or G2 is absolutely
continuous, i.e. having no atoms. The case G2 ´ 1 is clear for then supp(G2) = f0g.
Hereafter, we assume G2 6´ 1, and argue that G2 is absolutely continuous. Now,










where G2(t¡) = lim²#0 G2(t¡²) for t > 0 and G2(0¡) = 0. But A2 then implies that Á(t)
is constant on co(supp(G2)). This is impossible if G2 has an atom at any t ¸ 0, for then
Á(t) ¡ lim¿"t Á(¿) = ¯ ¼1[G2(t) ¡ G2(t¡)]=[1 ¡ G2(t¡)] > 0.
Let g2(t) = G0
2(t) be the density function, and ¸2(t) = g2(t)=[1¡G2(t)] the hazard-rate
function. Payoﬀ-time stationarity says that ¼(¾jh;t) = ˆ ¼1 does not depend on t. So:









d¿ = ¡¯ ¼1¸2(t) + [r1 + ¸2(t)]ˆ ¼1:
Hence ¸2(t) = r1ˆ ¼1=(¯ ¼1 ¡ ˆ ¼1) = ¸2 is constant. Since ¸2 ¸ 0, ¯ ¼1 ¸ ˆ ¼1. This implies that
G2(t) = 1 ¡ c ¢ e¡¸2t, where c 2 (0;1]. But, if c < 1, then G2(0) = 1 ¡ c > 0, so that
G2 has an atom at 0. Hence, c = 1. Therefore, G2 = 1 ¡ e¡¸2t whether G2 is absolutely
continuous or places all probability mass at 0 (in which case we make ¸2 = 1). ¤
93.2 Bargaining as a Continuous Time Markov Process
By action-time independence, oﬀers are made at a constant rate, and from a time-invariant
oﬀer distribution. We next impose that after any event history, the players’ behaviour
depends exclusively on their current expected values.
A4. Action-payoﬀ stationarity: ¼(¾jh)=¼(¾jh0) ) ¾jh=¾jh0, for all oﬀer nodes h;h0.
Action-payoﬀ stationarity is the primary basis for our aspirational reﬁnement of SPE.
It asserts that the players’ strategies are functions of their aspirations while bargaining.
We now show that an SPE obeying A1–A4 admits a simple Markovian structure,
summarized by a state space A , and a quintuple (v0;¸;¹;®;½), where
² v0 2 A ´ f(v1;v2) 2 R2
+ j v1 + v2 · 1g
² ¸ = (¸1;¸2) with ¸i : A 7! R+ [ f1g
² ¹ = (¹1;¹2) with ¹i : A 7! ∆([0;1])
² ® = (®1;®2) with ®i : A £ [0;1] 7! [0;1]
² ½ = (½1;½2) with ½i = (½i1;½i2) : A £ [0;1] 7! A
and where (for well-deﬁned expectations) ¸i, ®i and ½i are assumed (Borel) measurable
functions, and ¹i(Bjv) ´ ¹i(v)(B) is a measurable function of v for each B 2 B([0;1]).
Such a quintuple recursively speciﬁes an aspirational proﬁle (AP), hereby denoted
¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½), as follows: Starting at stage n = 0 with the initial state v0 2 A , each
player i randomly and independently chooses a time ti from the distribution F¸i(vn) (pos-
sibly 1) to propose an oﬀer xi from the distribution ¹i(¢jvn). If t1 · t2, then player 1’s
oﬀer x1 is made, and player 2 accepts it with chance ®2(vn;x1). If t1 > t2, then player 2’s
oﬀer x2 is made, and player 1 accepts it with chance ®1(vn;x2). If player i rejects the
oﬀer xj (possibly not in supp(¹j(vn))) then vn+1 = ½i(vn;xj). Finally, increment n by 1.
An AP ¾ = ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½) has a simple recursive structure which we now exploit.
Let ¯ HN ´ fh 2 HN j h is ﬁniteg. After any history h 2 ¯ HN, the continuation strategy
proﬁle ¾jh is another AP ¯ ¾(v;¸;¹;®;½) with the same structure but a diﬀerent initial state
v 2 A . So any history h = f(i1;x1;t1);(j1;N;t1);::: ;(in;xn;tn);(jn;N;tn)g 2 ¯ HN, with
rejected oﬀers at times t1 · t2 · ¢¢¢ · tn, generates a state vector V½(hjv0) by repeatedly
applying the function ½. Let v`+1 = ½j(v`;x`), where j is i`’s opponent, ` = 0;::: ;n ¡ 1;
then V½(hjv0) = vn. Moreover, as noted above, ¾jh = ¯ ¾(V½(hjv0);¸;¹;®;½).
So far, our deﬁnition of an AP ¾ = ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½) only speciﬁes players’ actions after
ﬁnite histories. We still must specify actions after inﬁnite histories (i.e., cluster points
and deadlocks). For our purposes, we can prescribe arbitrary behavior after any inﬁnite
histories that occur with probability 0 in an SPE ¾. In that case we can pick an arbitrary
v¤ 2 A and deﬁne ¾jh = ¯ ¾(v¤;¸;¹;®;½) for all h 2 H+ [ H++. But if ¾ produces cluster
points with positive probability, the extension to inﬁnite histories cannot be arbitrary.
Deﬁnitions A strategy proﬁle ¾ coincides with an AP ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½) if for any oﬀer
node h, ¾jh = ¯ ¾(¼(¾jh);¸;¹;®;½). An aspirational equilibrium (AE) is an SPE ¾ that
coincides with an AP ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½).
10Observe that if ¾ coincides with an AP ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½) then after any oﬀer node h,
the state of the AP coincides with the value of ¾jh.
Theorem 1 Let ¾ be an SPE satisfying A1–A4. Then ¾ is an AE ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½).
Proof: Let ¾ be an SPE obeying A1–A4. We ﬁrst deﬁne (v0;¸;¹;®;½). For each oﬀer
history h, let v = ¼(¾jh). Given A1–A3, Lemma 2 asserts that after h, players’ oﬀer times
follow exponential distributions, with parameters ¯ ¸1; ¯ ¸2. Put ¸i(v) = ¯ ¸i, for i = 1;2. By
assumption A1, the oﬀer distributions ¾x
i (h) and ¾t
i(h) are independent; let ¹i(v) = ¾x
i (h).
Given the atomless exponential distribution of proposal times, in equilibrium, ties and
instantaneous oﬀers almost surely do not occur (and so do not aﬀect expectations).
Assume that after the oﬀer history h, player i proposes ﬁrst. Player j accepts an
oﬀer xi at time T1(h) + t with chance ®j(v;xi) = ¾j(h [ f(i;xi;(T1(h) + t;1))g) =
°j(f(i;xi;(t;1))g), where ° = ¾jh. By A4, ° depends on h only through v = ¼(¾jh),
and by A1, °j(f(i;xi;(t;1))g) does not depend on t, so that ®j is well deﬁned. For such
an oﬀer, deﬁne the tail history h0 = f(i;xi;(t;1));(j;N;(t;2))g, and let ½j(v;xi) = ¼(°jh0).
Again, ½j is well deﬁned because ° only depends on v.
Fix a history h, and let t¤ be the last time of any cluster point or deadlock in h, if any,
or set t¤ = 0. Decompose h = h¤ [ Υ(t¤;1)(h0), where h0 2 ¯ HN, and let v¤ = ¼(¾jh¤) and
v = ¼(¾jh). By deﬁnition, ¾jh = ¯ ¾(v¤;¸;¹;®;½)jh0 = ¯ ¾(v;¸;¹;®;½) since v = V½(h0jv¤).
Hence, v = ¼(¯ ¾(v;¸;¹;®;½)). ¤
3.3 IC Condition Characterization of Aspirational Equilibrium
For any strategy proﬁle ¾, let A (¾) denote its set of continuation values (on and oﬀ the
outcome path implied by ¾). Formally,
A (¾) = f¼(¾jh) j h is an oﬀer nodeg ½ A :
We now identify an intuitive weak (mutual) individual rationality (IR) requirement for
oﬀers — it must provide both players with nonnegative surplus over their current values.
Lemma 3 If ¾ is an AE ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½), then supp(¹j(v))½[vi;1 ¡ vj] for all v2A (¾).
Proof: After an oﬀer xj 2 supp(¹j(v)) is made, player i’s continuation value is xj,
and since ®i(v;xj) > 0, xj ¸ vi. We claim that xj · 1 ¡ vj. By contradiction, assume
xj > 1 ¡ vj. If i accepts this oﬀer, j gets 1 ¡ xj < vj. Alternatively, if ®i(v;xj) < 1
and i rejects this oﬀer, then i’s continuation value is ½ii(v;xj) = xj. Since ½i(v;xj) 2 A ,
we have ½ii(v;xj) + ½ij(v;xj) · 1 and ½ij(v;xj) · 1 ¡ xj. So j’s expected value after
oﬀering xj equals ®i(v;xj)(1¡xj)+(1¡®i(v;xj))½ij(v;xj) < vj. In either case player j’s
continuation value is less than vj, a contradiction. Hence, supp(¹j(v)) ½ [vi;1 ¡ vj]. ¤
The players essentially bargain over the remaining surplus 1 ¡ v1 ¡ v2. Since, by
Lemma 3, any equilibrium oﬀer xj must obey vi · xj · 1¡vj at the aspiration pair (v1;v2),
it must concede a fraction of the surplus. The surplus concession fraction ·j 2 [0;1] obeys
xj = vi + ·j(1 ¡ v1 ¡ v2): (2)
11For any AP ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½), we denote player i’s expected oﬀer by ¯ xi(v) =
R 1
0 x¹i(v)(dx),
for v 2 A , and the corresponding expected surplus concession fraction by ¯ ·i(v) =
[¯ xi(v) ¡ vj]=[1 ¡ v1 ¡ v2]. We now give the incentive compatibility conditions for an AE.
Theorem 2 (IC Conditions) Assume ¾ coincides with an AP ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½). Then,
¾ is an AE iﬀ for all v 2 A (¾) and oﬀers x 2 [0;1], vi satisﬁes the waiting IC equation




¯ xj(v) with equality if ¸i(v) < 1 (3)





= x if ®i(v;x) 2 (0;1)
· x if ®i(v;x) = 1
¸ x if ®i(v;x) = 0:
(5)
Proof: Let h be an oﬀer node such that v = ¼(¾jh) satisﬁes ¸i(v) < 1 and ¸j(v) > 0.
After any such history, the equilibrium conditions are equivalent to (a) player i is willing
to wait for j’s oﬀer; (b) player j is indiﬀerent among his equilibrium oﬀers, and cannot
improve his expected value by deviating; (c) after rejecting x, player i expects at least x if
he is required to reject x with positive probability, and no more than x if he is required to
accept x with positive probability. Condition (a) was the original logic behind (1), which
yields (3) with equality. Next, any oﬀer x is accepted by j with probability ®j(v;x),
and when it is rejected, i’s aspiration value drops to ½ji(v;x). Condition (b) is equivalent
to (4). Finally, (5) follows from (c), where ½ii(v;x) > x only if x is an oﬀ-path oﬀer.
Next assume ¸i(v) = 1, so that player i makes an oﬀer immediately. In this case, he
need not be willing to wait and (3) may hold with strict inequality. Similarly, if ¸j(v) = 0,
player j makes no oﬀers (even though by deﬁnition of ¾ he still must choose an oﬀer for
time 1). In this case, (4) need not be satisﬁed with equality when x 2 supp(¹j(v)). ¤
Suppose that ¸1(v);¸2(v) < 1 for all v 2 A (¾). Then, ¯ xi(v) > v1 by (3), while
(4) asserts that i’s expected continuation value upon oﬀering is his current value vi. In
other words, the payoﬀ to waiting exceeds that of oﬀering. Players are thus engaged in
a sequence of wars of attrition until agreement. Put diﬀerently, there is an endogenous
proposee advantage, unlike the hard-wired proposer advantage with temporal monopoly.
It is easy to construct AE’s using Theorem 2. We will build on the earlier symmetric
aspiration function '(x) = (1 ¡ x)=(1 + x). Observe that even with pure oﬀers, the IC
conditions allow two degrees of freedom for each player’s choice of (¸;¹;®;½). So ﬁxing
the aspiration set (and thereby ½) still leaves one degree of freedom in choosing (¸;¹;®).
Earlier, we also assumed a constant acceptance rate ®. We now consider a constant
surplus concession. In section 3.4, we shall see that a constant oﬀer rate ¸ is impossible.
Example (Constant Surplus Concession): In a ·-concession rule, each player
concedes a ﬁxed surplus fraction · 2 (0;1] whenever he makes an oﬀer. By (3) and (4),
¸i(v) =
rjvj
·(1 ¡ v1 ¡ v2)
and ®j(v;x) =
vi ¡ '(x)
1 ¡ x ¡ '(x)
:
12(The deﬁnition of ®j(v;x) can be modiﬁed to strictly punish player i for deviant oﬀers, if
so desired.) Then one can easily verify that ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½) is an AE for all v0 2 G(').
Finally, an AE cannot have both a constant acceptance rate and constant conceded
surplus fraction ·. For a constant · is equivalent to a constant angle of incline from the
aspiration vector v to the oﬀer (1 ¡ ¯ x1; ¯ x1). A constant acceptance rate then forces the
aspiration set A (¾) to lie inside and parallel to the Pareto frontier. This contradicts
Lemma 6 below, that A (¾) must approach the Pareto frontier at the extremes.
We can now rigorously establish one of our claimed ‘intuitive’ properties of an AE.
Corollary 1 If j’s equilibrium oﬀer xj is rejected with strictly positive chance, and re-
jection incurs more delay, then rejection strictly harms j, and acceptance strictly helps j.
Proof: Let v 2 A (¾) be the current value of the AE ¾. Delay after rejection implies
½ii(v;xj) + ½ij(v;xj) < 1. By assumption, 0 < ®i(v) < 1, and therefore ½ii(v;xj) = xj
and ½ij(v;xj) < 1¡½ii(v;xj) = 1¡xj. Finally, by (4), vi is the strict convex combination
®i(v;xj)(1 ¡ xj) + (1 ¡ ®(v;xj))½ij(v;xj), and thus ½ij(v;xj) < vj < 1 ¡ xj. ¤
3.4 The Proposal Rate
A. Positive Aspirations. The aspiration value set A (¾) includes values that can only
be reached after deviations from ¾. For much of our analysis, only aspiration values that
can be reached on the equilibrium path matter. Accordingly, let AIR(¾) ½ A (¾) be all
value vectors that can be reached after histories with only IR oﬀers. AIR(¾) includes all
equilibrium values and possibly some non equilibrium values, but it excludes, for example,
values reachable only if one player’s overly generous oﬀer were rejected. (Assumptions
will now be enumerated B1, B2, etc., since they instead constitute reﬁnements of AE.)
B1. No Extreme Oﬀers: No player i ever accepts the oﬀer xj = 0, and is never the ﬁrst
to make a full concession oﬀer xi = 1.
Assumption B1 does not rule out the possibility that the oﬀer xi = 1 be required in
equilibrium after some history h. But, if xi = 1 is required, it must be that along h,
player i has already made the oﬀer xi = 1 (out of equilibrium) at some point.
Lemma 4 If ¾ is an AE ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½) satisfying B1, and v 2 A (¾), then v > 0.
Proof: (Part 1) By contradiction, suppose ﬁrst that (0;v2) 2 A (¾) for some v2 2 (0;1]. If
player 1 oﬀers x1 = 1 and player 2 rejects it, the continuation value is (0;1). Since v2 < 1,
player 1 never oﬀered x1 = 1 along the history leading to (0;v2). But starting at (0;v2),
the continuation strategy must deliver the pie split (0;1). Thus, in equilibrium either 1
oﬀers x1 = 1 or 2 oﬀers x2 = 0 and player 1 (eventually) accepts it, contrary to B1.
(Part 2) Finally, we show that (0;0) = 2 A (¾). If (0;0) 2 A (¾), then starting at v =
(0;0), no one proposes again. Consider the out of equilibrium oﬀer x1 2 (0;1) by player 1.
If player 2 accepts this oﬀer, then 1 gets 1 ¡ x1 > 0, violating (4). Hence, ®2(v;x1) = 0.
But for player 2 to be willing to reject x1, we must have ½2(v;x1) = (0;v0
2) 2 A (¾) for
some v0
2 ¸ x1, contradicting Part 1. ¤
13B. Inﬁnite or Zero Proposal Rates. The element of our model absent from temporal
monopoly models is the oﬀer rate. We ﬁrst must understand when player i never oﬀers,
or insistently does so — i.e. when the rate ¸i implied by an AE is zero or inﬁnity.
Lemma 5 Assume ¾ is an AE ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½) satisfying B1. For any v 2 A (¾): (a)
¸i(v) = 0 implies that ¸j(v) > 0; (b) ¸i(v) = 1 for some player i iﬀ v1+v2 = 1, in which
case the game ends immediately with the split v; (c) deadlocks almost surely do not occur.
Proof: Let v = ¼(¾jh) 2 A (¾) for the oﬀer node h. Assume ¸i(v) = 0. If ¸j(v)=0, then
bargaining stops and expected values are ¼(¾jh)=(0;0). This contradicts Lemma 4.
For (b), assume that ¸i(v) = 1. Then after history h, player i oﬀers xi immediately.
From Lemma 3, supp(¹i(v)) ½ [vj;1 ¡ vi]. If xi > vj, then player j earns at least xi by
accepting, so that ¼j(¾jh) > vj. Contradiction. Hence, ¹i(v) is a point mass at xi = vj.
But since ®j(v;xi) > 0 by A3 and rejecting xi moves the state back to v, player j accepts vj
immediately in real time (eventually in artiﬁcial time). This implies that i’s expected value
is vi = ¼i(¾jh) = 1¡vj. Thus, v1+v2 = 1. Conversely, any delay causes ineﬃciency. So if
v1 + v2 = 1, at least one of the two players i must oﬀer immediately, that is, ¸i(v) = 1.
Finally, (c) follows from (b) and A3 (since the values are ﬁxed if ever ¸i(v) = 1). ¤
If v0
1 +v0
2 < 1, the state vector v is never on the Pareto frontier (until agreement), and
hence, inﬁnite oﬀer rates are never observed on the equilibrium path. But the state v can
land on the Pareto frontier after an oﬀ-path oﬀer. For example, player i may make an out
of equilibrium oﬀer, which calls for player j to reject with probability 1. After rejection,
the continuation value vector is arbitrary and can be chosen to be on the Pareto frontier.
We now address the opposite case where ¸i = 1, which forces v1 + v2 = 1.
Corollary 2 Immediate agreement on any eﬃcient v with v1;v22(0;1) is an AE outcome.
In light of this corollary, the interesting implications obtain for AE with delay. We
thus hereafter assume v0
1 + v0
2 < 1, and so we have delayed agreement, as ¸1;¸2 < 1.
C. Exploding Proposal Rates on the Boundary. We now consider the boundary
behavior of the proposal rates ¸i. Work by Perry and Reny (1993), Sakovics (1993), and
Stahl (1993) showed that imposing a boundedly positive delay time between oﬀers confers
an oﬀerer advantage — for then declining burns a boundedly positive fraction of the pie.
It’s instructive to see that this is not a feature of our model. Indeed, oﬀer rates must
explode in some subgames. To see this, we argue that AIR(¾) touches or approaches the
Pareto frontier, and that the proposal rate blows up at these aspiration vectors.
Lemma 6 Fix an AE ¾. If ¯ vi = supfvi j v 2 AIR(¾)g, then [(¯ v1;1¡¯ v1)+B"]\AIR(¾) 6= ;
and [(1 ¡ ¯ v2; ¯ v2) + B"] \ AIR(¾) 6= ; for all " > 0, where B" denotes the " ball in R2.
Proof: WLOG, let i = 2. By contradiction, assume [(1 ¡ ¯ v2; ¯ v2) + B"] \ AIR(¾) = ; for
some ² > 0. Consider the triangle ∆ with vertices (1¡ ¯ v2; ¯ v2), (1¡ ¯ v2;0) and (1;0). Note
that v2 is uniformly bounded away from ¯ v2 in the region ∆n[(1¡¯ v2; ¯ v2)+B"]. Therefore,
14by the deﬁnition of ¯ v2, there exists v 2 AIR(¾) with v1 < 1 ¡ ¯ v2 and v2 < ¯ v2. Suppose
that player 1 then oﬀers x 2 (¯ v2;1¡v1) (possibly oﬀ-path). If ®2(v;x) = 1, then his ﬁnal
payoﬀ is 1 ¡ x > v1, and oﬀering x immediately lifts his payoﬀ, a contradiction. But if
®2(v;x) < 1, then player 2 must expect a continuation value of at least x > ¯ v2. So there
exists w 2 AIR(¾) with w2 > ¯ v2, contrary to the deﬁnition of ¯ v2. ¤
Theorem 3 (Boundary Proposal Rates) Let ¾ be an AE ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¼;®;½). Assume
w = (y;1 ¡ y) is a limit aspiration vector, where y 2 (0;1). Then limv!w ¸i(v) = 1,
i = 1;2. If y = 0, then limv!w ¸1(v) = 1, and if y = 1, then limv!w ¸2(v) = 1.
Proof: Since supp(¹1(v)) ½ [v2;1 ¡ v1], as v 2 AIR(¾) approaches w = (y;1 ¡ y), ¹1(v)
converges in probability to a point mass at 1¡y. By condition (3) of an AE (in Theorem 2)
1 ¡ y = lim
v!w








If 1 ¡ y 6= 0, then limv!w ¸1(v) = +1. Similarly, (3) yields limv!w ¸2(v) = +1 if y 6= 0:
y = lim
v!w








That is, as a player’s aspiration value converges to the lowest possible payoﬀ he will
ever get in any AE, he makes oﬀers at an increasingly unbounded pace. If y 2 (0;1),
when the aspiration vector v is near the Pareto frontier and the surplus 1¡v1¡v2 is close
to 0, then both players make oﬀers very often. When y = 0 (resp. y = 1), the conclusion
only applies to player 1 (resp. 2). Recall that for the AE ¾ speciﬁed by a ·-concession
rule and the function '(x) = [1 ¡ x]=[1 + x], we have that ¸i(v) = rj=[·vi]. Thus, this ¾
provides an example where ¸2(v) but not ¸1(v) tends to 1 as v ! (1;0).
Example (Battle of the Sexes): Suppose that in equilibrium, players are en-
gaged in a war of attrition to ﬁrst propose their less favoured pie split among (2=3;1=3) and
(1=3;2=3); such an oﬀer is always accepted. (Think of this as a method of deciding which
pure equilibrium to play in a Battle of the Sexes.) This is an AE with v0 = (1=3;1=3)
provided ¸1 = r2 and ¸2 = r1 (to satisfy the IC conditions). But A (¾) must contain more
than just v0, as player i can always make oﬀers like x = 1=2. The simplest aspiration
set is A (¾) = f(1=3;2=3);(1=3;1=3);(2=3;1=3)g — where after any oﬀer by i, the value
reverts at once to j’s favoured outcome. For v 2 f(1=3;2=3);(2=3;1=3)g, at least one oﬀer
rate must be inﬁnite for immediate agreement.
Notice that the conclusion of Corollary 1 fails for this example. In fact, if the oﬀer is
rejected (oﬀ-path), then agreement is still immediate at that proposal. No harm is done.
D. Exploding Proposal Rates in the Interior. We now ask whether an AE can have
a proposal rate explosion at an aspiration vector v that is not on the Pareto frontier. We
now show this can occur, and likewise cluster points can occur with positive probability.
We then provide a simple intuitive condition that rules it out.
15Example (Exploding Proposal Rates): Assume that r1 = r2 = 1 and v0 =
(3=8;3=8). Consider the function ' : (1=4;1=2) ! (1=4;1=2) given by '(x) = 3=4¡x, with











For all v 2 G('), let ½ij(v;x) = '(x) and ½ii(v;x) = x if x ¸ vi, and ½i(v;x) = v if














0 if x < ¯ xi(v)
2vi ¡ 1=2 if x ¸ ¯ xi(v):
When v 2 f(1=4;1=2);(1=2;1=4)g, we continue as in the ‘Battle of Sexes’ example, to
(1=4;3=4) or (1=2;1=2) from (1=4;1=2), and to (1=2;1=2) or (3=4;1=4) from (1=2;1=4).
As vi # 1=4 and vj " 1=2, we have ¸i(v) " 1, ·i(v) # 0, and ®j(v; ¯ xi(v)) # 0. Thus, the
AP ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½) may generate a cluster point in ﬁnite time. In particular, for example,
starting at v0 = (3=8;3=8), consider an inﬁnite history h where player 1 makes all the oﬀers
¯ x1(vk) that player 2 always rejects, where vk+1 = ('(¯ x1(vk)); ¯ x1(vk)) for all k ¸ 0. The
set of such histories has probability Π1
k=0(1 ¡ ®2(vk; ¯ x1(vk)))¸1(vk)=[¸1(vk) + ¸2(vk)] > 0
(proof omitted). Along any such history h, oﬀers arrive increasingly rapidly, becoming
stingier and more likely to be rejected. The expected elapse time of the k-th oﬀer by
player 1 is tk = 1=¸1(vk) = 2¡k=[2(4 ¡ 2¡k)]; therefore, the expected time of the cluster




2¡k=6 = 1=3. Let ¾ be the AE that
coincides with ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½) for any ﬁnite history. For an inﬁnite history h 2 H+ ending
with player i making a sequence of oﬀers converging to 1=2 in ﬁnite time (a cluster point),
put ¾ = ¯ ¾(vi;¸;¹;®;½), where vi
i = 1=4 and vi
j = 1=2.
We noted in x3.2 that our AP does not fully describe strategies with cluster points. It is
natural to ask how to rule out this possibility. In fact, the example works because surplus
concessions ·i and acceptance chances ®j both vanish as we approach (vi;vj) = (1=2;1=4).
The next result shows that if we rule out this possibility, cluster points cannot obtain.
Lemma 7 Let ¾ be an AE ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¼;®;½) such that for any closed subset A in the interior
of A , there exists · > 0 such that ¯ ·1(v); ¯ ·2(v) ¸ · > 0 for all v 2 A. Then proposal rates
¸1(v);¸2(v) are bounded in the set A. Hence, cluster points (and inﬁnite histories, if B1
holds) happen with probability zero, except possibly at the last moment of bargaining.
Proof: The result follows from rewriting the delay IC equation (3) as
¸j¯ ·j = viri=(1 ¡ v1 ¡ v2): (6)
4 Properties of Aspirational Equilibrium
4.1 Bargaining Duration via Aspirations as a Submartingale
Denote by ¿(v0) the random time to agreement when the initial aspiration vector is
v(0) = v0. When the players follow an AE ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½), at any time t until ¿(v0), each
player has a well-deﬁned aspiration level vi(t) between oﬀer events. Moreover, if an oﬀer
16transpires at time t, then let vi(t) be the expected value of player i immediately after the
proposal is tendered, but before its content is heard, and ¯ vi(t) just after the content is
heard and the reply is given. (Deﬁne ¯ vi(t) = vi(t) at all other times.)
We now assert that the process e¡ritvi(t) is a martingale ‘until’ the players reach an
agreement at time ¿(v0). We eliminate the termination date in the following artiﬁcial
stochastic process, where we “freeze” the terminal value:
zi(t) =
(
e¡ritvi(t) for t · ¿(v0)
e¡ri¿(v0)¯ vi(¿(v0)) for t > ¿(v0).
The process ¯ zi(t) is likewise deﬁned, using ¯ vi(t) for t · ¿(v0) instead.
Theorem 4 Let ¾ be an AE ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½). The stochastic processes zi(t) and ¯ zi(t) are
martingales. The aspiration process vi(t) is a strict submartingale until agreement time ¿.
For an intuition about the martingale, either player is indiﬀerent about oﬀering, since
he expects his value back by waiting and never oﬀering. Of course, the ﬁnal agreement
time may owe to either player proposing, and so conditional on getting proposed to, the
expected discounted value exceeds the current value. The proof shows that this surplus
over the martingale exactly balances the loss in the event that a player ends up as proposer.
Proof of Theorem 4: Fix t 2 (0;1). First consider the zi(t) process. Let µi ¸ 0 be the
time to the ﬁrst (hypothetical) oﬀer by player i (i.e., the realization of ¾t
i(;)). Let ¿k ¸ 0
be the time to the k-th oﬀer event. Deﬁning a^b ´ minfa;bg, we thus have ¿1 = µ1 ^µ2.
Almost surely, the number of oﬀers in [0;t] is ﬁnite, and hence t = limk!1 t^¿k. Then by
the Dominated Convergence Theorem, limk!1 E[z(t^¿k)jz(0) = v0] = E[z(t)jz(0) = v0].
We will prove that v0 = E[z(t^¿k)jz(0) = v0] for all k < 1 and so v0 = E[z(t)jz(0) = v0].
We ﬁrst show that z(0) = E[z(t ^ ¿1)jz(0)]. Then by the strong Markov property,
E [z(t ^ ¿k+1)jz(0)] = E [E [z(t ^ ¿k+1)jz(t ^ ¿k)]jz(0)] = E [z(t ^ ¿k)jz(0)];
and thus by induction, z(0) = E[z(t ^ ¿k)jz(0)] for all k ¸ 1. Consider the events
B1 = [t > ¿1 and µ1 < µ2], B2 = [t > ¿1 and µ1 ¸ µ2] and B3 = [t · ¿1]. Clearly
fB1;B2;B3g is a partition of the states of the world. Since µ1 and µ2 are independent

















Further, we have the conditional expectations
² E[z1(t ^ ¿1)jB1] = v1(0)E[e¡r1µ1jB1] by (4) of Theorem 2
² E[z1(t ^ ¿1)jB2] = ¯ x2(v0)E[e¡r1µ1jB2] since the AE ¾ obeys ¾x
2(;) = ¹2(v0)
² E[z1(t^¿1)jB3] = v1(0)e¡r1t since the aspiration value is constant on [0;t] if t < ¿1.
17Since P[Bi] = ¸i
£
1 ¡ e¡¸0t¤
=(¸1 + ¸2) for i = 1;2; and P[B3] = e¡¸0t, by equation (3) of
Theorem 2, we have E[z1(t ^ ¿1)jz1(0)] equal to


















Finally, for the process ¯ zi(t) we only need to observe that by (3) and (4) of Theorem 2,
E[¯ z(t)jz(t)] = z(t), and therefore E[¯ z(t)j¯ z(0) = v0] = v0 as well.
Finally, the discounted martingale implies the un-discounted submartingale. ¤
By the martingale convergence theorem, since values are a bounded submartingale,
they almost surely converge. But being generated by an AP, they are also a Markov pro-
cess; so any limit value v must be stationary under the dynamic. But the only stationary
values are on the Pareto frontier, where the real delay time is zero, by Lemma 5. Hence,
Corollary 3 (Bargaining Finiteness) Bargaining ends almost surely in ﬁnite time.
Not only is the bargaining duration ¿(v0) a.s. ﬁnite, but we can bound it below too:
Corollary 4 (a) In an AE, we have E[¿(v0)] ¸ ¡log[v0
1 + v0
2]=max(r1;r2).
Hence, (b) if players i and j made the the last two oﬀers, xi and xj, and both were rejected,
then the expected time until the bargaining ends is at least ¡log(x1 + x2)=max(r1;r2).
Proof: Denote ¯ r = max(r1;r2) and ¯ ¿ = E[¿(v0)]. By the Optional Stopping Theorem,
v
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since ¯ zi(t) is a martingale process, and ri · ¯ r. Because (¯ v1(¿(v0)); ¯ v2(¿(v0))) is the ﬁnal
agreed pie split, it lies on the Pareto frontier, or ¯ v1(¿(v0)) + ¯ v2(¿(v0)) = 1. Finally, since
E[e¡¯ r¿(v0)] ¸ e¡¯ r¯ ¿(v0) by Jensen’s inequality, we have v0
1 + v0
2 ¸ e¡¯ r¯ ¿, as required in (a).
For part (b), after the ﬁrst oﬀer is rejected, v2 = x1. After the second oﬀer, v1 = x2
and v2 drops below x1 (Corollary 1). Thus, v1 + v2 · x1 + x2. Now apply part (a). ¤
4.2 Relating Oﬀer Rates, Oﬀers, and Acceptance Rates
We now relate our three strategic choices (¸;¹;®) — suppressing arguments where clear.
A. Oﬀers and Timing. The war of attrition aspect of bargaining yields a simple testable
implication about rejected oﬀers alone, consistent with Siegel and Fouraker (1960).
Corollary 5 (Consecutive Oﬀers) If a player makes consecutive equilibrium oﬀers,
then his second oﬀer is strictly more generous to the other player. If players i;j make
sequential oﬀers xi and xj, then player j oﬀers i less than i oﬀered himself: xj · 1 ¡ xi.
Proof: After player i makes a proposal that is rejected, the new aspiration value shifts
down for player i, and up to xi for player j. Now apply Lemma 3. ¤
18The IC conditions yield stronger implications about oﬀer timing and acceptance rates.
By the new delay IC (6):
vi =
rj¸j¯ ·j
rirj + ri¸i¯ ·i + rj¸j¯ ·j
(7)
From this formula, as the chance that j oﬀers vanishes, i’s value vanishes. By contrast,
in a temporal monopoly, as the chance that j gets to oﬀer vanishes, j’s value vanishes.
Equation (7) also betrays a crucial separability between the delay and oﬀer IC equa-
tions (6) and (4), evident in our examples and theorems. Surplus concessions · interact
with oﬀer rates ¸ alone to determine current values in (6); the aspiration set is only
relevant in the linkage in (4) between surplus concessions · and acceptance rates ®.
Corollary 6 Ceteris paribus, the rate ¸j that player j oﬀers varies inversely with the
expected fraction of surplus in the pie ¯ ·j that he concedes.
Corollary 6 captures the inherent trade-oﬀ between oﬀer timing and content: Ceteris
paribus (holding values ﬁxed), if a player anticipates a more generous oﬀer, then he should
expect to wait longer. This is consistent with Corollary 4, that less generous alternating
oﬀers foretell a greater lower bound on the expected bargaining duration.
Equation (7) also provides insights into the nature of bargaining power. With temporal
monopoly, there are two exogenous sources of asymmetry: relative impatience levels, and
the oﬀering order. In our aspirational paradigm, oﬀering order is not an issue, but there
is a intuitive new strategic component of bargaining power: Parties gain strength from
their refusal to make oﬀers. As is so often true in social bargaining, one can hurt the
other party by according him the “silent treatment”, forcing him to make all overtures.
B. Oﬀers and Acceptance Rates. Our theory is much richer when we move beyond
AE like the Battle of Sexes where players simply “make an oﬀer that can’t be refused.”
We now relate the content of oﬀers to the acceptance rates. By using coarse bounds from
the IC conditions, we ﬁnd two necessary inequalities jointly satisﬁed by all parameters
(¸;·;®). They are especially useful as they obtain for any aspiration set, and any oﬀer.
Corollary 7 Consider an oﬀer xi by player i that might be rejected (®j < 1). Then
®j
1 ¡ ®j
(1 ¡ ·i)ri < ¸j¯ ·j (8)
Proof: Using (2), rewrite the oﬀer IC equation (4) as
(1 ¡ ®j)(vi ¡ ½ji(v;xj)) ¸ ®j(1 ¡ ·i)(1 ¡ v1 ¡ v2)
Since rejection values are positive (by Lemma 4), and ®j < 1, (6) yields the inequality. ¤
Corollary 7 captures the trade-oﬀ between the acceptance rate and surplus concession
of a given oﬀer: Ceteris paribus, if an oﬀer concedes too little surplus, it must be accepted
with a small chance. Corollary 7 shows that incentive constraints inherently force lower
bounds on surplus concession fractions and oﬀer rates, and upper bounds on acceptance
rates. Eg., if oﬀers are accepted at least half the time, and concede half the surplus (·1 =
·2 = 1=2), then i’s proposal rate must exceed j’s interest rate. Only in extreme cases like
the Battle of Sexes, which concede all the surplus, can oﬀers almost surely be accepted.
194.3 Simple Aspiration Sets
A. Decreasing Aspiration Sets. We now give plausible assumptions that guarantee
a continuously decreasing IR aspiration set AIR(¾): There exists an open interval W =
(w; ¯ w) ½ [0;1] (with closure ¯ W = [w; ¯ w]) and a continuous, strictly decreasing function
' : ¯ W ! [0;1] with: '(w) = 1¡w, '( ¯ w) = 1¡ ¯ w, and AIR(¾)[f(w;1¡w);( ¯ w;1¡ ¯ w)g =
G('). Depending on ¾, (w;1 ¡ w) and ( ¯ w;1 ¡ ¯ w) may or may not be in G(').4 The
simplicity of the constant ® and · examples owed to this property of the aspiration sets.
We assume that as soon as a player, say 2, hears an IR oﬀer x1, the past is forgotten,
and his behaviour only depends on the new interim aspiration value vector (v1;x1).
B2. Interim Stationarity. The oﬀerer’s continuation value ½ij(v;xj) is independent of
the rejecter’s value vi, and ½ii(v;xj) = xj for all v 2 A (¾) and IR oﬀers xj. So if
v;v0 2 A (¾) satisfy vj = v0
j and xj ¸ max(vi;v0
i), then ½ij(v;xj) = ½ij(v0;xj).
B2 obtains if the acceptance chance obeys interim stationarity (so ®i(v;xj) is constant in
vi for vi 2(0;xj]). We next assume in B3 that the same oﬀer to a player with a greater
value be accepted with a lower chance; we also assume away in B4 examples like the
Battle of Sexes. Not conceding all surplus is in the same spirit as the second part of B1.
B3. Strict Acceptance Monotonicity. Fix vj. The chance ®i(v;xj) that i accepts j’s oﬀer
xj is strictly decreasing in the proposee’s value vi for all v 2 A and xj 2 [vi;1 ¡ vj].
B4. No Full Concessions. For every v 2 AIR(¾), ¯ ·i(v) < 1, i = 1;2.
Assumptions B2–B4 are satisﬁed by the constant · and ® examples (' being 1-1); B2
and B4 are violated by the Battle of Sexes example. Unlike earlier assumptions, B2–B3
place restrictions both on and oﬀ the equilibrium path. Eg., B2 says that the proposer’s
continuation value is the same after any IR (possibly out-of-equilibrium) oﬀer is rejected.
Lemma 8 Given assumptions B2–B4, the IR aspiration set AIR(¾) is decreasing.
Proof: Assume that v;v0 2 A (¾) with vj = v0
j and vi < v0
i. Let xj 2 supp(¹j(v0)) such that
xj < 1¡vj (guaranteed by B4). Then v0
j = ®i(v0;xj)(1¡xj)+(1¡®i(v0;xj))½ij(v0;xj), and
since ®i(v0;xj) > 0 (by A3) and 1 ¡ xj > v0
j, we must have ½ij(v0;xj) < v0
j. Therefore, if
player j makes the same oﬀer xj at v, he expects ®i(v;xj)(1¡xj)+(1¡®i(v;xj))½ij(v;xj) >
v0
j = vj since ®i(v;xj) > ®i(v0;xj) by B3, and ½ij(v;xj) = ½ij(v0;xj) by B2. Hence,
player j can raise his expected value vj by oﬀering xj, a contradiction.
For each w 2 A with w1 +w2 < 1, let L(w) denote the right triangle with vertices w,
(w1;1 ¡ w1) and (1 ¡ w2;w2). Clearly if L(w) and L(w0) contain AIR(¾), then AIR(¾) ½
4If (1 ¡ x;x) 2 AIR(¾) were reached from v 2 AIR(¾) after player 1, say, made an oﬀer x and player
2 rejected, then w · (1¡x;x) (because the oﬀer x is IR). That is, 1 ¡x = ½21(v;x). By (4), v1 = 1 ¡x,
for otherwise oﬀering x strictly increases player 1’s expected value, contradicting B4 below. Hence,
(1¡x;x) 2 AIR(¾) can only be reached in the limit after a cluster point. Thus, (w;'(w)) 2 AIR(¾) only
if ¾ can produce a cluster there.
20L(w) \ L(w0). Also, there exists w00 such that L(w) \ L(w0) = L(w00). Let L¤ be the
intersection of all triangles L(w) containing AIR(¾). Then L¤ 6= ; since v0 2 L¤, and
clearly there exists w¤ such that L¤ = L(w¤). Let w = w¤
1 and ¯ w = 1 ¡ w¤
2. We now
show that AIR(¾) intersects every vertical and horizontal line through L¤ once and only
once. Suppose, eg., the vertical line at some level v1 2 (w; ¯ w) does not intersect AIR(¾):
i.e. fv1g £ [0;1] \ AIR(¾) = ;. Then [0;v1] £ [0;1 ¡ v1] \ AIR(¾) = ;. For if w were in
this intersection and player 2 oﬀered x2 = v1 at w, then ½1(w;x2) 2 fv1g£[0;1]\AIR(¾)
by B2. So AIR(¾) ½ L(w;1 ¡ v1) [ L(v1;1 ¡ ¯ w). But for any w 2 L(w;1 ¡ v1), say,
and any IR oﬀer xi at w, ½j(w;xi) 2 L(w;1 ¡ v1). Thus, AIR(¾) ½ L(w;1 ¡ v1) or
AIR(¾) ½ L(v1;1 ¡ ¯ w), depending on which contains v0, contrary to the deﬁnition of L¤.
If AIR(¾) is not decreasing, there must exist two Pareto-ranked points v;v0 2 AIR(¾),
say v < v0. Since v0 is the only point in AIR(¾) on the horizontal line through v0, if player 1
oﬀers x1 = v0
2 at v, he gets 1 ¡ x1 ¸ v0
1 > v1 if the oﬀer is accepted and v0
1 otherwise. His
expected value is thus strictly higher than v1 after making that oﬀer, a contradiction. So
no two points in AIR(¾) can be Pareto ranked, and AIR(¾) [ f(w;1 ¡ w);( ¯ w;1 ¡ ¯ w)g is
the graph of a decreasing function ' : ¯ W ! [0;1]. Since AIR(¾) intersects every vertical
and horizontal line through L¤, ' is continuous, and '(w) = 1¡w and '( ¯ w) = 1¡ ¯ w. ¤
Suppose that a mixture over oﬀers is entertained. Casual empiricism suggests that
the reason a proposer might consider sweetening an oﬀer is to ensure a greater chance of
acceptance. In his classic text, eg., Zeuthen (1930) simply assumes it as a behavioural
postulate of bargaining. In fact, this fails in our context unless the aspiration set is
well-behaved: Perhaps a less generous oﬀer is rewarded by a better continuation value.
Corollary 8 Assume B2–B4 (so that AIR(¾) is continuously decreasing). If x0 > x are
two IR oﬀers made by player i at the value v 2 AIR(¾), then ®j(v;x0) > ®j(v;x).
Proof: We have vi = ®j(v;z)(1 ¡ z) + (1 ¡ ®j(v;z))½ji(v;z) for z = x and z = x0. Since
A (¾) is decreasing, ½ji(v;x) > ½ji(v;x0), and ®j(v;x) < ®(v;x0). ¤
We can ﬁnally establish another of our claimed intuitive properties of an AE: strictly
IR oﬀers. Corollary 7, without assumptions B2–B4, directly implies that the expected
oﬀer is strictly IR: ¯ · > 0. Using AIR(¾) decreasing, we now deduce this for all AE oﬀers.
Corollary 9 Assume B2–B4. If v 2 AIR(¾) with v1+v2 < 1 and xi is an AE oﬀer at v,
then xi strictly increases player j’s aspiration: xi > vj.
Proof: By Lemma 3, suppose instead xi = vj. Since AIR(¾) is decreasing, player i gets
1 ¡ xi > vi if the oﬀer is accepted (which happens with positive chance by A3) and vi
otherwise. This yields player i an immediate positive expected gain. Contradiction. ¤
B. Convex Rejections and Consecutive Oﬀers. We introduce a stronger property











21This property obtains if ' is a convex function, and was satisﬁed by our constant ® and ·
examples. It will permit more powerful and intuitive conclusions about consecutive oﬀers.








ri + ¸j¯ ·j
(10)
In particular, it suﬃces that ®1 > ·2 and ®2 > ·1.
Proof: Using (8) and then (7), the right inequality of (9) holds iﬀ
1 ¡
®2(1 ¡ ·1)r1









r1r2 + r2¸2¯ ·2
since ½22(v;x1) = x1 = v2 ¡ ·1(1 ¡ v1 ¡ v2) by (2). This yields (10) for i = 1. ¤
So the convex rejections property obtains provided players’ oﬀers do not concede too
much surplus, or are not too likely to be rejected. A consequence of Lemma 9 and (6) is:
Corollary 10 (Consecutive Oﬀers, Encore) Assume (10), or more simply ®1 > ·2
and ®2 > ·1 (so that AIR(¾) has convex rejections). Then ¸j¯ ·j rises after player j’s
proposal is rejected; that is, he either must concede more surplus or oﬀer more rapidly.
Suppose that player j’s oﬀer has been rejected. We knew from Corollary 5 that his next
oﬀer must be more generous. We now know that ¸j¯ ·j is lower: He expects a smaller share
of the surplus. He must now either accelerate his proposal rate, or concede more surplus.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
We ﬁnally study what happens if one player becomes more impatient. As our bargaining
model admits a multiplicity of AE, it is not immediately obvious how to perform such an
exercise. Indeed, the AE played may vary with the interest rates (r1;r2). We ﬁrst observe
that for ﬁxed concessions and timing of both players, any player i’s value decreases with
his relative impatience ri=rj, by (6). But this says nothing about the eﬀect on the ultimate
pie split. Perhaps more impatient individuals tend to enjoy smaller bargaining delays. Our
simple approach below pursues this very line of thought, focusing on the proposal rate.
Notice that ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½) is an AE for the interest rates r = (r1;r2) iﬀ ¯ ¾(v0; ˆ ¸;¹;®;½)
is an AE for ˆ r = (ˆ r1; ˆ r2), where ˆ ¸ are the corresponding oﬀer rates ˆ ¸i = (ˆ rj=rj)¸i, i = 1;2.
So given any AE ¾, if player j becomes twice as impatient, and i doubles the rate that he
oﬀers in ¾, then the new strategy ˆ ¾ is an AE. This simple mapping, adjusting the oﬀers
rates in response to an interest rate change, but otherwise ﬁxing the strategy proﬁle and
aspiration set, allows us to compare the sets of AE for diﬀerent levels of impatience by just
comparing corresponding equilibria.5 We say that player i’s expected pie split is higher
5Milgrom and Roberts (1994) perform a similar comparison exercise for a monotone environment, using
the strong set order; this order, for instance, yields unambiguous shifts in the inﬁmum and supremum
of the equilibrium set. Neither their nor our exercise can be dispositive of how the realized equilibrium
actually changes. Here, one could even imagine that some more complex mapping might yield an opposite
set comparison. However, we just mean to question the unambiguity of the standard comparative static.
22with (ˆ r1; ˆ r2) than with (r1;r2) if the expected ﬁnal split in each AE ˆ ¾ = ¯ ¾(v0; ˆ ¸;¹;®;½)
for (ˆ r1; ˆ r2) exceeds that of the corresponding AE ¾ = ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½) for (r1;r2).
For our next result, we ﬁrst need an enhanced war of attrition property:
B5. Strong War of Attrition. For any v 2 AIR(¾), expected oﬀers obey ¯ x1(v)+¯ x2(v) ¸ 1.
As previously noted, the players are engaged in a war of attrition in terms of expected
continuation values; assumption B5 requires that the war of attrition property holds
(weakly) in terms of the immediate expected oﬀers (i.e. ignoring rejection values). Written
in the form ¯ xi(v) ¸ 1¡ ¯ xj(v), it has the following interpretation. At any v 2 AIR(¾), the
oﬀer by i to j is more generous to j than what j would oﬀer himself. That is, in terms of
the next oﬀer alone, it is always better to let your opponent speak ﬁrst.
For technical reasons, we also must strengthen assumption A3, that equilibrium oﬀers
are accepted with positive probability. Even though v1 + v2 < 1 for all v 2 AIR(¾), it
is still possible that there exist sequences fvng ½ AIR(¾) and fxn
jg 2 supp(¹j(vn)) such
that vn
1 + vn
2 ! 1 and ®i(vn;xn
j) ! 0. Assumption B6 precludes this possibility.
B6. Acceptance Positivity: Equilibrium oﬀers are accepted with at least chance ® > 0.
In light of (10) and (7), the lower bound ® > 0 in assumption B6 follows from the premise
of Lemma 7 except where values vanish. So provided A (¾) is boundedly positive, that
assumption implies B6. The next sensitivity analysis result is proven in the appendix.
Theorem 5 (Impatience Helps) Let ¾ be an AE ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½) satisfying B2–B6. If
ˆ ri=ri > ˆ rj=rj, then player i’s expected pie split is higher with interest rates ˆ r than with r.
6 Conclusion
Summary. We have analyzed the complete information bargaining problem truly with-
out procedures. Our approach therefore restricts the equilibrium concept rather than the
action space. Our reﬁnement of SPE is behaviourally-based, and inspired by research on
the importance of players’ aspirations in decision-making. It also yields a very tractable
theory of bargaining. While not unique, all AE have the same intuitive elements of bar-
gaining absent from the temporal monopoly theory: wars of attrition endogenously arise;
oﬀers are concessions; oﬀers may be declined, disappointing the proposer, or accepted,
strictly pleasing him. Oﬀer timing and content are also entwined. For instance, an embed-
ded martingale structure yields immediate bounds on the duration of bargaining. Further,
a player’s second consecutive oﬀer must be more generous that his ﬁrst. We have shown
more generally how acceptance rates, surplus conceded, and oﬀer rates are related.
Relative to temporal monopoly, our reﬁnement inverts the strategic role of the proposer
— no longer strength but weakness. This changes many results, and casts doubt on the
standard impatience comparative static. We show that for a natural mapping between
AE for diﬀerent discount rates, increased impatience skews the ﬁnal pie split in one’s
favour. Our methodology, showing how the expected absorbing state of a Markov process
changes as the initial state changes, is new and should be applicable elsewhere.
23En route, we have given a new formalization of continuous time games in the spirit of
standard extensive forms, specialized to our complete information bargaining context.
Literature Reprise. Temporal monopoly has been the foundation of most if not all
dynamic noncooperative bargaining papers written since 1982. Even behavioural bar-
gaining papers have adopted this paradigm. For instance, Yildiz (2001) admits diﬀerent
priors over who has the temporal monopoly each period (the ‘recognition’ process). Our
behaviourally-founded bargaining paper escapes this paradigm. We do, however, omit
an obviously important aspect of bargaining, by avoiding incomplete information. That
complication is the natural next hurdle to surmount.
This paper returns to some early inﬂuential views of bargaining. Edgeworth (1881),
for instance, thought [xII, p. 51] “there are an indeﬁnite number of arrangements ` a priori
possible, towards one of which the system is urged by ::: the Art of Bargaining — higgling
dodges and designing obstinacy, and other incalculable and often disreputable accidents.”
By avoiding temporal monopoly, we have given just such a stochastic story of bargaining,
despite complete information. Our randomness instead owes to mixed strategies and
imperfect information. Harsanyi (1956) even wrote that random elements may be the
source of bargaining strength: “Of course, information on the two parties’ ::: strength
alone may not suﬃce: the outcome may depend signiﬁcantly on such ‘accidental’ factors
as ::: bargaining skill.” This view is also well-captured by our model: Having randomly
oﬀered and been rejected ﬁrst, perhaps many times, hurts one’s bargaining position.
There is also a long-standing view of bargaining as an irreversible concession game,
which has naturally led to war of attrition analyses.6 Osborne (1985) oﬀers a simple com-
plete information war of attrition bargaining game, but unlike our completely unrestricted
oﬀers, assumes ﬁxed oﬀers.7 Abreu and Gul (2000) is a recent incomplete information war
of attrition. The war of attrition in Abreu and Pearce (2001) even owes to a concession
game. Our bargaining is a war of attrition, and yet is not a concession game. To see this
distinction, assume players each have two units in Abreu and Pearce’s ﬁve unit bargaining
problem. In their pure concession game, a player’s concession of the last unit cannot be
rejected. Just as in Rubinstein (1982), we have instead assumed exploding oﬀers — i.e.
implying no future commitment: Bygones are bygones.8
Exploding oﬀers not only ensures an analysis that is stationary in aspiration space,
but also captures the realistic inherent risk of declining any oﬀer: One may ultimately
oﬀer or accept a strictly worse outcome. Accepting an oﬀer is like an irreversible decision
to exercise an option, and spurning one like a risky decision not to sell an asset. If oﬀers
implied irrevocable commitments, some sort of third party commitment technology would
be required to enforce equilibria where the players gradually concede the pie.
6For a striking example, the pre-St˚ ahl frontier bargaining textbook Coddington (1968) amazingly
formalizes the bargaining problem as “represented quite generally by ::: (1) a pair of variables q1;q2
representing the demands of the bargainers at any point in time.” This view held at least since Hicks
(1932) and Zeuthen (1930), whose concession games unfolded in one instantaneous mental ﬂash.
7Our Battle of Sexes with ﬁxed oﬀers has this ﬂavour for on-path, but not oﬀ-path, oﬀers.
8eg. Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) assume players can’t accept worse oﬀers than they have rejected.
24A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Outcome Proﬁles are Well-Deﬁned: Proof of Lemma 1
Claim 1 If f hn j n 2 N g ½ H(¾), then h1 =
S
n2N hn 2 H(¾).
Proof: History h1 is a countable set, being a countable union of countable sets. Hence,
h1 2 P. Now for any (t;k) 2 [0;1)£f0;::: ;1g, there exists n 2 N with h1
(t;k) ½ hn. If
T(hn) = (t;k) and h` ½ hn for all ` 6= n, then h1 = hn and T(h1) = (t;k). In this case,
(t;k) 6Á T(h1), and we’re done. Otherwise, choose n so that h1




(t;k)) ½ hn ½ h1 since hn 2 H(¾). So h1 2 H(¾). ¤
For any time t1 2 R+ let
H
t1(¾) = f h 2 H(¾) j T1(h) · t1 g and µ(t1) = supÂf T(h) j h 2 Ht1(¾) g:
The supremum in the deﬁnition of µ(t1) is always attained. For example, if there is a
cluster point in real time at µ1(t1), then there exists a sequence fˆ hng ½ Ht1(¾) with
T1(ˆ hn) " µ1(t1). In this case, the supremum is attained at
S
n2N ˆ hn 2 Ht1(¾). And if
there is a deadlock at µ1(t1), then there is a sequence fˆ hng ½ Ht1(¾) such that T(ˆ hn) =
(µ1(t1);n), and again the supremum is attained at
S
n2N ˆ hn.
For each n 2 N, let hn 2 Hn(¾) be such that T(hn) = µ(n).
Claim 2 For every h 2 H(¾) with T1(h) < +1, there exists n 2 N such that h ½ hn.
The claim asserts that f h 2 H(¾) j T1(h) < +1 g =
S
n2N Hn(¾).
Proof: Let h 2 H(¾) be such that T1(h) < 1. By deﬁnition, h ½ hn for all n ¸ T1(h).
If Ã¾(h) 6= h, then ¯ ¾(h) = (i;s;(t;k)) where t < 1. Therefore, T1(Ã¾(h)) = t < 1, and
Ã¾(h) ½ hn for all n ¸ T1(Ã¾(h)). ¤
Claim 3 The map ¾ 7! h¾ 2 H is well-deﬁned by h¾ =
S
n2N hn.
Proof: Denote h1 =
S
n2N hn. Claim 1 implies h1 2 H(¾). We ﬁrst show that
Ã¾(h1) = h1. If T1(h1) < +1, Claim 2 yields h1 ½ hn for some n. In this case,
h1 = hn = h` for all ` > n, and Ã¾(h1) = Ã¾(hn) = hn. (This case occurs when ¾
leads to an oﬀer that is accepted, or to a juncture where no player speaks again.) Next,
if T1(h1) = 1, then Ã¾(h1) = h1, by deﬁnition.
We ﬁnally show that if ¯ h 2 H(¾) is such that Ã¾(¯ h) = ¯ h, then h1 ½ ¯ h. It is enough
to show that h ½ ¯ h for all h 2 H(¾). By contradiction, assume this is not the case. Let
(¯ t;¯ k) = supÂf T(h) j h 2 H(¾) and h ½ ¯ h g:
Assume ﬁrst that ¯ t < 1. Then the supremum is attained (the argument is similar to
that in Claim 1). Then there exists h 2 H(¾) such that T(h) = (¯ t;¯ k). If Ã¾(h) = h,
then h1 = h ½ ¯ h, a contradiction. If Ã¾(h) 6= h, then, since T(Ã¾(h)) Â T(h) = (¯ t;¯ k),
Ã¾(h) 6½ ¯ h, contradicting the fact that ¯ h 2 H(¾). Now assume that ¯ t = +1. In this case,
¯ h ¾ hn for all n, and thus ¯ h ¾ h1
Thus, h1 is the smallest element of H(¾) with h1 = Ã¾(h1). Hence, h1 = h¾. ¤
25A.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Proof of Theorem 5
Let ¾ be an AE ¯ ¾(v0;¸;¹;®;½). By Lemma 8, AIR(¾) is the graph of a continuous
decreasing function ' : W ! [0;1], where W = (w; ¯ w). We will expand the set of
states and view the bargaining process on the equilibrium path as a stochastic process,
where agreement corresponds to absorption on the Pareto frontier. With each w 2 W
we identify two states, wA and wB. The ﬁrst represents the absorbing (or agreement)
state (w;1¡w) on the Pareto frontier, and the second the transient (or bargaining) state
(w;'(w)). Abusing notation, denote ¹i(w;'(w)) by ¹i(w).
For every v 2 A , let °(v) = ¸1(v)=[¸1(v) + ¸2(v)] be the chance that in equilibrium
player 1 makes the next oﬀer at the aspiration vector v. Deﬁne e(w) = 1 ¡ w, w 2 [0;1].
Below, we will exploit the fact that our bargaining process is really a mixture of the
two artiﬁcial processes where only one of the players i = 1;2 makes all the oﬀers. Indeed,
let MN
i (w;B) (MY
i (w;B), resp.) be the chance that from an initial state w 2 W, the
next period’s state is a transient (absorbing) state in B 2 B(W), when player i makes























for all w 2 W and B 2 B(W). The bargaining stochastic process is described by the










1 (w;B) + (1 ¡ °(w))M
Y
2 (w;B):
Thus, MN(w;B) is the mixture of the chances MN
1 (w;B) and MN
2 (w;B), i.e. the chance
that from an initial state w 2 W, the next period’s state is a transient state via B. This
transition probability depends on both the random oﬀers and the acceptance chances.
Let K be the set of stochastic kernels K : W £B(W) ! [0;1], where for each w 2 W,
K(w;¢) 2 ∆(W), and for B 2 B(W), K(¢;B) is a measurable function. Each stochastic
kernel K represents the transition probabilities from transient to absorbing states for
some stochastic process. For each w 2 W and B 2 B(W), K(w;B) is the chance that
when the process starts at the transient state w, it enters the set absorbing states in B.
For any kernel K 2 K, let ¯ K(w) =
R
W xK(w;dx) be the expected absorbing state when
the process starts at the bargaining state w 2 W. For any two kernels K1;K2 2 K, write
K1 ¹ K2 if ¯ K1(w) · ¯ K2(w) for all w 2 W. The poset (K;¹) is a complete lattice.
We assume ˆ r1=r1 > ˆ r2=r2, so that ˆ °(w) > °(w) for all w 2 W. Let Q (resp. ˆ Q) be the
kernel corresponding to the stochastic process generated by the AE ¾ (resp. ˆ ¾).
Deﬁne Ψ : K ! K by
Ψ(K)(w;B) = °(w)Ψ1(K)(w;B) + (1 ¡ °(w))Ψ2(K)(w;B)






i (w;dx) + M
Y
i (w;B)
for each w 2 W and B 2 B(W). The stochastic kernel Q satisﬁes the standard equation
Q(w;B) = Ψ(Q)(w;B) for all w 2 W and B 2 B. Similarly, ˆ Q is a ﬁxed point of the
map ˆ Ψ deﬁned using ˆ ° in place of °.
Step 1 If Q ¹ ˆ Ψ(Q), then Q ¹ ˆ Q.
Proof of Step 1: By Tarski’s ﬁxed point theorem, ˆ Q = sup fK j K ¹ ˆ Ψ(K)g º Q: ¤
By Step 1, since Q = Ψ(Q), it suﬃces to show that Ψ(Q) ¹ ˆ Ψ(Q). We have
Ψ(Q)(w;B) = °(w)Ψ1(Q)(w;B) + (1 ¡ °(w))Ψ2(Q)(w;B)
ˆ Ψ(Q)(w;B) = ˆ °(w)Ψ1(Q)(w;B) + (1 ¡ ˆ °(w))Ψ2(Q)(w;B)
for all w 2 W and B 2 B(W). Since °(w) < ˆ °(w) for each w 2 W, Ψ(Q) ¹ ˆ Ψ(Q) iﬀ
Ψ1(Q) ¹ Ψ2(Q). We must prove that for any initial transient state, player 1 gets a larger
expected share from the process where player 2 makes all oﬀers than with reversed roles.




N(w;B)d»(w) · ¯»(B) for all B 2 B(W);
and »(B) ¸ m(B) for all B 2 B(W), where m denotes Lebesgue measure.
Proof of Step 2: Let V denote the set of signed measures of bounded variation on
(W;B(W)) with the total variation norm. The Banach space V is the dual of L1(W).







N(x;B)d»(x) + m(B) 8» 2 V;B 2 B(W):
Consider instead V with the weak-¤ topology. It is easy to see that Φ is continuous
when V has this topology. Indeed, suppose that f»ng ½ V is such that »n ! » in the
weak-¤ topology. That is, hf;»ni ! hf;»i for all f 2 L1(W), where, for example,
hf;»ni =
R
W f(x)d»n(x). Fix f 2 L1(W). Let g(x) = [1=¯]
R
W f(y)MN(x;dy). Since
f 2 L1(W), we have g 2 L1(W) as well. Therefore,












g(x)d»n(x) = hg;»ni ! hg;»i = hf;Φ(»)i ¡ hf;mi:
27Let C be the set of all positive measures » on (W;B(W)) such that »(W) · ¯m(W)=







N(x;W)d»(x) + m(W) · (1 ¡ ®)»(W)=¯ + m(W)
·
1 ¡ ®
¯ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)
m(W) + m(W) = ¯m(W)=[¯ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)]:
Thus, Φ(C) ½ C. As C is a convex, bounded and closed subset of V (with the total
variation topology), it is weak-¤ compact by Alaoglu’s Theorem. By Schauder’s Fixed
Point Theorem, Φ : C ! C has a ﬁxed point ». Finally, » = Φ(») implies that for all
B 2 B(W), »(B) ¸ m(B) and
R
W MN(x;B)d»(x) = ¯[»(B) ¡ m(B)] · ¯»(B): ¤
Let L be the space of functions K : W £ B ! R such that for each w 2 W, K(w;¢)
is a signed Borel measure on W, and for each B 2 B(W), K(¢;B) is a (Borel) measurable








where jK(w;¢)j is the positive measure K+(w;¢)+K¡(w;¢). Then, L is a Banach space.
Step 3 K is a closed subset of L and Ψ : L ! L is a contraction.
Proof of Step 3: Pick K;K0 2 L and let D(w;B) = jK(w;¢)¡K0(w;¢)j(B) for all w 2 W
and B 2 B(W). For each B 2 B(W), we have that












W D(w;W)d»(w) = ¯kK ¡ K0k: ¤
We projected the aspiration set AIR(¾) into the horizontal axis to construct the one-
dimensional bargaining state space W. Alternatively, since ' is strictly decreasing, we
could have projected AIR(¾) into the vertical axis to produce a “dual” state space W ¤ =
'(W) = (1¡ ¯ w;1¡w). For each kernel K 2 K there corresponds a dual kernel K¤, deﬁned
by K¤(w;B) = K('¡1(w);e(B)) for each w 2 W ¤ and B ½ B(W). When player 2 has an
initial aspiration value w, player 1 has the initial aspiration value '¡1(w), and player 2’s
ﬁnal share is in B iﬀ player 1’s share is in e(B). Thus, K¤(w;B) represents the probability
that when player 2’s expected value is w, his share in the ﬁnal split is in the set B.
Step 4 Let ˆ K be the set of kernels K 2 K such that (i) ¯ K(w) ¸ w for all w 2 W; (ii)
¯ K¤(w) ¸ w for all w 2 W ¤. Then the ﬁxed point Q of Ψ belongs to ˆ K.
28Proof of Step 4: ˆ K is a closed subset of L. Hence, by Step 3, it is enough to show that
Ψ(K) 2 ˆ K for all K 2 ˆ K.
Note that '¡1(w) is the new bargaining state when player 1 makes the admissible oﬀer
w and player 2 rejects it. Fix K 2 ˆ K and denote J = Ψ(K). We ﬁrst show that J satisﬁes
constraint (i) above. We have J(w;¢) = °(w)J1(K)(w;¢) + (1 ¡ °(w))J2(K)(w;¢), where
Ji = Ψi(K). Therefore,
¯ J(w) = °(w)
Z
'(W)
[(1 ¡ ®2(w;x)) ¯ K('
¡1(x)) + ®2(w;x)(1 ¡ x)]¹1(w)(dx)
+ (1 ¡ °(w))
Z
W





¡1(x) + ®2(w;x)(1 ¡ x)]¹1(w)(dx)
+ (1 ¡ °(w))
Z
W
[(1 ¡ ®1(w;x))x + ®1(w;x)x]¹2(w)(dx)
¸ °(w)w + (1 ¡ °(w))¯ x2(w) ¸ w;
because w = (1 ¡ ®2(w;x))'¡1(x) + ®2(w;x)(1 ¡ x) for each x 2 ['(w);1], by (4) in
Theorem 2, and because supp(¹2(w)) ½ [w;1] (so ¯ x2(w) ¸ w) by Theorem 2. A symmetric
argument shows that J also satisﬁes (ii). Therefore, Q 2 ˆ K. ¤
Step 5 Properties (i) and (ii) imply Ψ1(K) ¹ Ψ2(K) for all K 2 ˆ K.
Proof of Step 5: Pick any K 2 ˆ K and as before denote Ji = Ψi(K), i = 1;2. Since the sum
of the players’ expected ﬁnal shares cannot exceed 1, player 2’s expected share starting at
w 2 ¯ W cannot exceed 1 ¡ ¯ K(w). By (ii), this expected share is at least '(w) (since the
aspiration value of w for player 1 corresponds to the aspiration value '(w) for player 2).




[(1 ¡ ®2(w;x)) ¯ K('












[(1 ¡ ®1(w;x))x + ®1(w;x)x]¹2(w)(dx) = ¯ x2(w)):
By B3, ¯ x2(w) ¸ 1 ¡ ¯ x1(w), and thus Ψ1(K) = J1 ¹ J2 = Ψ2(K). ¤
Since Q 2 ˆ K, we have Ψ1(Q) ¹ Ψ2(Q), and therefore Q ¹ ˆ Q, as required. ¤
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